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 Abstract
 
 Antitrust and regulatory concerns continue to swirl around the payment cards industry, for 
understandable reasons:  The industry is clearly not atomistic in structure; it has substantial network 
characteristics and thus embodies network externalities; it involves two-sided markets; and its two 
most prominent members -- Visa and MasterCard -- are network joint ventures of the banks that 
issue credit and debit cards to individual cardholders and that enroll (acquire) and service the 
merchants who accept those cards. 
 These characteristics raise the possibility that the industry may not be fully competitive -- 
that market power may currently be present and/or may prospectively be created or enhanced as a 
consequence of a merger -- and thus raise potential policy concerns.  But these same characteristics 
also cloud the standard against which the performance of the industry should be judged.  And they 
complicate the analysis that is necessary to form judgments. 
 This essay attempts to clarify some of these issues while exploring the same themes as does 
Emch and Thompson (2006): market definition, market power, and payment card networks. 
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1. Introduction 
Antitrust and regulatory concerns continue to swirl around the payment cards industry, for 
understandable reasons:  The industry is clearly not atomistic in structure; it has substantial network 
characteristics and thus embodies network externalities; it involves two-sided markets; and its two 
most prominent members -- Visa and MasterCard -- are network joint ventures of the banks 
("issuing banks") that issue credit and debit cards to individual cardholders and the banks 
("acquiring banks") that enroll (acquire) and service the merchants who accept those cards. 
 These characteristics raise the possibility that the industry may not be fully competitive -- 
that market power may currently be present and/or may prospectively be created or enhanced as a 
consequence of a merger -- and thus raise potential policy concerns.  But these same characteristics 
also cloud the standard against which the performance of the industry should be judged.  And they 
complicate the analysis that is necessary to form judgments. 
 This essay will attempt to clarify some of these issues while exploring the same themes as 
does Emch and Thompson (2006): market definition, market power, and payment card networks.  As 
background, in Section 2 we will discuss the issue of market definition for the purposes of analyzing 
mergers that might prospectively create or enhance market power.  The market definition paradigm 
that has become the standard framework in antitrust merger analysis can be applied (with due 
recognition of their special characteristics) to payment networks.  In Section 3 we again discuss 
market definition, but this time in the context of concerns about monopolization -- about the current 
existence of market power.  As we will argue, the analytical framework for market definition that 
has worked well for well over two decades for merger analysis has substantial deficiencies in the 
monopolization realm.  Section 4 will briefly address two-sided markets.  Section 5 then addresses 
payment card markets and the approach taken by Emch and Thompson (2006) in analyzing market 
definition, mergers, and monopolization in these markets.  Section 6 offers a brief conclusion. 
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2 Market Definition for Merger Analysis 
Policy concerns about the exercise of market power usually arise in one of two contexts: (a) existing 
market structures and/or market practices that may allow existing firms unilaterally or jointly to 
exercise market power; and (b) mergers that may allow the merged firm (and possibly its rivals) 
prospectively to exercise newly formed or enhanced market power.  The assessment of existing or 
prospective market power usually requires the delineation (definition) of a market in which the 
market power might be exercised.  In this section we will discuss market definition for merger 
analysis purposes; in the next section we will return to market definition in the context of 
monopolization allegations. 
 For over two decades, the standard approach for antitrust analysis of mergers has been that 
of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, first developed by the Department of Justice's Antitrust 
Division in 1982.1  At the center of the Guidelines is a market delineation paradigm that, in essence, 
searches for the minimum number of products (distributed over geographic space and product space) 
that would be capable of being monopolized.  It does so by focusing on demand-side substitutability, 
asking (for an initial, narrowly defined candidate set of products) the following question:  Could a 
hypothetical monopolist (that was selling these products) succeed in profitably imposing a "small 
but significant and nontransitory increase in price" above existing levels?  (This question has come 
to be known as the "SSNIP" test.)  If the answer is yes, then the candidate set of products constitutes 
a relevant market for merger analysis purposes.  If the answer is "no" (because too many buyers 
would switch away to buying other products), then the set of products is expanded and the question 
asked again, until a "yes" answer is reached.  In essence, the SSNIP test asks if a group of products 
can be monopolized; if they can, then they constitute a relevant market for antitrust merger analysis. 
                                                          
     1 The Guidelines were modified in 1984, 1992, and 1997.  The current version can be found at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/201898.htm. 
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 Once the relevant market has been delineated, the remainder of the Guidelines analysis 
attempts to ascertain whether the proposed merger would be likely to allow the merged firm to 
exercise the market power that is central to the antitrust concern about mergers.  The overall level of 
seller concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), the market shares of the 
merging parties, the ease of expansion by smaller firms and by producers of close substitutes, entry 
conditions generally, the nature of the buying side of the market, the homogeneous or heterogeneous 
nature of the product, and the antitrust history of the industry are among the characteristics of the 
delineated market that are examined.2  The efficiencies promised by the merging parties are also 
considered, although a common problem is that such efficiencies are easy to promise ex ante but 
may be difficult to deliver ex post. 
 A good example of the use of the Merger Guidelines and its market definition paradigm can 
be found in FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066 (1997).3  In September 1996 Staples proposed to 
acquire Office Depot.  Initially, this appeared to be a merger that would raise little antitrust concern, 
since most of the office products that both "office super store" (OSS) chains sold were also sold 
through a wide variety of other outlets, such as Wal-Mart, Kmart, grocery stores, drug stores, and 
stationery stores, as well as by a third OSS (Office Max).  The two merging OSSs accounted for less 
than 10% of overall sales of these products. 
 However, an initial simple comparison of the prices of a standardized set of office products 
                                                          
     2 There are two primary theories of the prospective exercise of market power that underlie this examination.  One 
theory is "coordinated effects", which might be characterized as "traditional oligopoly theory".  Thus, the worry is that the 
merged firm and its close rivals will find a price increase to be jointly beneficial and will find implicit (or possibly even 
explicit) means to achieve it.  The exposition by Stigler (1964) is in this spirit.  The other theory is "unilateral effects", 
which applies to sellers of differentiated products.  Here the concern is that there may be a sufficient number of customers 
of one of the two merging companies whose runner-up preferences are for the product of the other company and whose 
preferences are sufficiently strong such that the merged firm may be able unilaterally to raise its price to these customers 
(if it can identify them and thus practice price discrimination) or to raise its prices overall (so that the gains from the 
"trapped" customers exceed the losses from other customers who turn to other sellers). 
     3 Further discussion of this case can be found in Baker (1999), White (2002), and Dalkir and Warren-Boulton (2004). 
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sold by the OSSs showed that prices were highest when either Staples or Office Depot was the only 
OSS chain in a metropolitan area, they were lower when there were two OSS chains present in a 
metropolitan area, and they were lower still when all three OSS chains were present in a 
metropolitan area.  More sophisticated econometrics conducted by the FTC, which corrected for 
other characteristics of the metropolitan areas, upheld the finding of these differentials. 
 As the FTC argued, these price differentials indicated that a single OSS seller could sustain -
- and in fact was sustaining -- higher prices, and thus office products sold through OSSs in a 
metropolitan area constituted a relevant market for the purposes of analyzing the merger.  Since 
there was only one other OSS chain and entry was perceived to be difficult, the merger would mean 
that the relevant metropolitan markets would consolidate from two OSSs to one (where only Staples 
and Office Depot were present) and from three OSSs to two (where Office Max was also present).  
The efficiencies that Staples and Office Depot promised seemed dubious. 
 Though Staples and Office Depot argued that the relevant markets were much wider than 
just OSSs and that the promised efficiencies were substantial, the FTC's view prevailed in court, and 
the merger was stopped. 
 With suitable modification for the complexity that is inherent in payment card networks (as 
will be discussed in Sections 4 and 5), the Merger Guidelines paradigm for market definition and its 
overall approach to preventing increases in market power seem quite applicable to these networks. 
 
3 Market Definition in Monopolization Cases 
In contrast to merger analysis, there is no standard paradigm for market definition in monopolization 
cases.  And, as we will argue, the Merger Guidelines' paradigm is generally not applicable.4
 In a typical monopolization antitrust challenge, a plaintiff (usually a private party but 
                                                          
     4 Further discussion of these points can be found in Nelson and White (2003) and White (2006). 
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occasionally the government) alleges that the defendant has market power and that its practices have 
allowed the defendant to exclude competitors and thereby exercise that market power and charge 
prices that are above competitive levels.5  An initial step in this process is the specification of a 
market in which the defendant has a large share and is thereby implicated in exercising market 
power.  Until the 1980s the (high) profit rates of the defendant were usually an important part of the 
evidence that the plaintiff would use in its argument.  But the weaknesses of using standard (GAAP) 
accounting data for these profit calculations6 have brought them into disfavor.  In principle (and 
subject to availability), cross-section data in local markets that would relate differing prices to 
differing levels of seller concentration (e.g., of the type that was found in the Staples case and that 
can be found in analyses of other retail markets and more generally in analyses of other goods and 
services with localized markets, such as railroad freight hauling, airline passenger services, hospital 
services, cement, etc.) could shed light on the relevant market and whether the defendant has been 
exercising market power.7
 However, what cannot be used is the Merger Guidelines' SSNIP test.  If an analysis is 
conducted as to whether the defendant could profitably raise its price by a "small but significant 
amount" from existing levels, the answer ought (for a profit-maximizing defendant) to be "no" 
regardless of whether the defendant truly does have market power or the defendant is merely one 
                                                          
     5 In a regulatory context, there may simply be the claim that the candidate (for regulation) firm is exercising market 
power and charging above-competitive prices. 
     6 See, for example, Carlton and Perloff (2005, pp. 249-252 ) for a list and discussion of eight deficiencies in 
accounting data for these purposes. 
     7 Also, as Werden (2000) has pointed out, the Merger Guidelines market definition paradigm can be used if the legal 
action is being undertaken so as to stop a prospective action by the defendant -- e.g., the plaintiff is seeking a preliminary 
injunction to enjoin a proposed action that the plaintiff alleges will allow the defendant to exercise market power.  In this 
case, the same forward-looking perspective of the Merger Guidelines -- will this action make things worse? will the 
defendant's prospective action allow it to impose a "small but significant nontransitory increase in price"? -- can be 
brought to bear.  But most antitrust and regulatory concerns with monopolization involve complaints about the current 
existence of market power and not its nascent formation. 
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among many firms in a differentiated product market.  Thus, the question is useless for the task at 
hand. 
 Unfortunately, there has not been sufficient realization that the SSNIP test is inappropriate 
for monopolization cases.8  Further, the loose language that economists sometimes use to describe 
monopolies and their powers -- e.g., that a monopoly has the power to raise the price over 
competitive levels (rather than that the monopoly has the power to maintain the price at a level that 
is above competitive levels) -- tends to encourage the (misguided) notion that a SSNIP test would be 
an appropriate test. 
 Perhaps the best illustration of a legal decision going off-course because of the inappropriate 
asking of this question is in U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (1953), 351 
U.S. 377 (1956).  In December 1947 the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Division charged du 
Pont with monopolization of the cellophane market.  The company had a 76% share of cellophane 
sales and indirectly controlled the remaining 24% through a licensing agreement with the other seller 
of cellophane (Sylvania Industrial Corporation of America).  Du Pont, in its defense, claimed that 
the relevant market was instead "flexible wrapping materials" (including kraft paper, waxed paper, 
aluminum foil, polyethylene, pliofilm, glassine, parchment, Saran, and cellulose acetate, as well as 
cellophane), of which its sales accounted for only 18%. 
 Both the initial trial court in its 1953 decision and the Supreme Court on appeal in its 1956 
decision9 endorsed du Pont's position.  Both decisions emphasized that du Pont faced competition 
from other flexible wrapping materials and was thereby constrained from raising its price of 
cellophane.  But, of course, du Pont (if it was maximizing profits on behalf of its shareholder-
                                                          
     8 Nelson and White (2003) provide examples of prominent economists and prominent legal decisions that have made 
the mistake of asking this question in a monopolization context. 
     9 The Supreme Court's decision in favor of du Pont was by a 4-3 vote. 
  
 
 7
owners) should have already been maintaining its cellophane prices at levels at which a further 
increase would have been unprofitable; in essence, it would be constrained by the prices of 
substitutes from being able to raise its price profitably from observed levels, regardless of whether 
the relevant market was cellophane and du Pont was exercising market power or the relevant market 
was flexible wrapping materials and du Pont was not exercising market power.10  This mis-directed 
analysis has since come to be known as "the cellophane fallacy". 
 Unfortunately, with the SSNIP test ruled out, profitability data in disfavor, and cross-section 
price-concentration data often not available, the issue of market definition for monopolization 
analysis remains as one that is desperately in need of a paradigm.  This need for a paradigm applies 
equally well to the area of payments networks.  Though the Merger Guidelines paradigm will 
adequately handle the issue of a merger between payments networks (e.g., a merger between 
American Express and Discover), suppose instead that the issue is the current exercise of market 
power.  Does American Express currently exercise market power?  Does Discover?  Does Visa or 
MasterCard?  How could we tell? 
 
4 Two-sided markets 
At first-glance, two-sided markets (of which payment networks are clearly an example), where there 
are positive demand externalities that extend between the two markets, may appear exotic and 
difficult to comprehend.  However, newspapers and other publications where the firm's revenues 
come from a mixture of subscriptions (and/or per-unit sales) and advertising are a familiar example; 
cable television is another; more recently, movie exhibition (where advertisements that precede the 
                                                          
     10 In their critique of the District Court's decision, Stocking and Mueller (1955) pointed out that du Pont's profits from 
cellophane were substantially larger than its profits from rayon, where it faced 15-18 other producers of a commodity 
product and where its market share (less than 20%) was approximately the same as its 18% share of the "flexible 
wrapping materials" market; they also pointed out that du Pont's price of cellophane moved independently of the prices of 
other flexible wrapping materials. 
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feature presentation have become pervasive) is yet another. 
 In all of these instances, the enterprise has to determine the profit maximizing balance 
between the subscription (or per-unit) price and the advertising fees and their consequences for 
attracting/deterring numbers of readers/viewers on the one hand and advertisers on the other, as well 
as determining the type and mix of content that will appeal to readers/viewers (and thus appeal to 
advertisers as well).11  When set in this context, the issues are less exotic and more manageable.  As 
we will argue, the same can be said for payment networks. 
 The positive externalities between the markets of the enterprises of this type mean that the 
standard normative prescription of price equal to marginal cost no longer holds for each market 
considered separately.  Instead, the positive externalities also have to be taken into account.  Further, 
in considering how a merger might affect pricing, again the positive externalities have to be included 
in the analysis, and the net effects of both prices should be considered.12
 
5 Payment networks 
Because the terminology and the tracking of "who does what and to whom" in payment networks 
can be confusing, a few diagrams may prove useful.  In Figure 1 we portray a simple payment card 
network: a charge/credit card network in which the cardholder buys goods/services (the solid line) 
from the merchant and makes payments through the network (the dashed line); network 
owner/operator deals directly with the cardholder and with the merchants that accept the card.13  The 
     11 If we use newspapers and other periodicals as an example, it is apparent that the mix of editorial content and 
advertising can range from a pattern of all editorial content and zero advertising (e.g., Consumer Reports) to a pattern of 
zero editorial content and all advertising (e.g., local "shoppers" and classified ad periodicals), and the prices charged to 
readers for the periodicals themselves are usually positive but can encompass a range that includes zero (with all of the 
revenue support for the periodical coming from advertising). 
     12 General discussions of two-sided markets can be found in, for example, Evans (2003), Wright (2004), and Roson 
(2005). 
     13 This is sometimes described as a "proprietary" network; see, e.g., Evans and Schmalensee (1999), Schmalensee 
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market is two-sided:  The network is interested in attracting credit/charge cardholders, who will use 
their cards to buy goods and services from card-accepting merchants (with an extension of credit to 
the cardholder from the network owner); and it is interested in attracting merchants, for whom the 
network's provision of credit to customers may substitute for the merchant's extending credit (and 
the attendant costs to the merchant), as well as the network's payment to the merchant substituting 
for the cash or check payments from customers (and their attendant costs).  The greater are the 
number of cardholders, the more attractive is the network to the merchant (who must bear some 
fixed costs of set-up, such as card readers, as well as any per-transaction fees); and the more 
merchants that are part of the network and accept the card, the more attractive is the card to the 
cardholder.14
 At the center of the network is the network owner.  And it is clear that the network owner 
can charge fees -- positive or negative -- to cardholders and to merchants so as to find the best 
combination (indicated by the sum of fpn + tpn within the central box of Figure 1) that will maximize 
the overall profitability of the network.  The fees portrayed in the figure are levied per transaction; 
but there can also be fixed fees (on cardholders and/or merchants) as well as special charges. 
 The framework portrayed in Figure 1 basically describes the structure of the American 
Express and Discover networks until quite recently.15
 
(2002), and Rochet and Tirole (2002); see also Hunt (2003) and Chakravorti (2003). 
     14 In the language of Economides and White (1994), this is a one-way network, in the sense that the goods flow only 
in one direction, and the payments flow only in the other direction. (This is in contrast, say, with a telephone network, in 
which the flows of communications can go in either direction between any two members of the network.)  Unlike a two-
way network, where there are direct externalities -- an additional member of a network conveys direct benefits to the 
other members (in a telephone network, the other members can call and be called by the new members (Rohlfs 1974, 
2001)) -- in a one-way network the externalities are indirect:  An existing cardholder gets no direct benefit when an 
additional cardholder joins the network; the benefits come indirectly, as a consequence of more merchants accepting the 
card when there are more cardholders.  Similarly, a merchant that already accepts the card gets no direct benefit when 
another merchant decides to accept the card; again, the benefits come indirectly, as a consequence of more consumers 
deciding to use the card when there are more merchants that accept the card. 
     15 As a consequence of the Justice Department's victory in U.S. v. Visa USA Inc., 163 F. Supp.2d 322 (2001), 344 
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 Figure 2 is somewhat more complicated, since it brings into the picture banks for dealing 
with cardholders and with merchants and the network owners (Visa and MasterCard) as the 
connection between the banks.  A further complication is the fact that Visa and MasterCard are 
themselves joint ventures of the banks that participate in their networks.  Also, since banks are now 
in the picture, the diagram can also represent debit card networks.16  Further, with three entities 
between the cardholder's payment and the merchant's receipt of payment, there are now the 
possibility of four layers of fees.17  One fee in particular -- the "interchange" fee -- is the fee 
(specified by the network) that must be paid by the acquiring bank to the issuing bank (through the 
network).18,19
 
F.3d 229 (2003), the two networks can now use banks as their intermediaries.  Prior to that victory, both Visa and 
MasterCard had membership rules that forbade member banks in the U.S. from issuing Discover or American Express 
cards. 
     16 Also, the diagram could readily encompass automatic teller machine (ATM) networks, except the "merchant" would 
be replaced by the ATM and the flow of goods replaced by a flow of immediate cash. 
     17 If the issuing and acquiring banks are fully competitive and efficient, then their presence adds no complications and 
Figure 2 can be collapsed down to Figure 1.  Since Visa and MasterCard are joint ventures of the participating banks, it 
might seem that the competitive nature of the banks might preclude the exercise of market power by either network:  If 
the network levied fees and then rebated the fees to the banks/owners in proportion to a bank's activity in the network, 
then the bank would include the rebate in its calculations of marginal revenues and thus would expand its activity and 
lower its price and thereby pass through the network fees back to cardholders and/or merchants.  But if the network fees 
are passed back to the banks/owners in ways that are not proportional to activity, they would not become part of a bank's 
marginal calculations, and the network could become the vehicle for the constituent banks jointly to reap the gain from 
the network's exercise of market power.  See Lewis and Reynolds (1979). 
     18 In Figure 2, the interchange fee is best represented by tib.  As Emch and Thompson (2006) and Schmalensee (2002) 
point out, there is no necessary reason why the interchange fee has to be paid by the acquiring bank to the issuing bank.  
It could be paid in the opposite direction, depending on what maximizes the profitability of the network.  In Australia, the 
interchange fees for PIN debit cards are paid in this "reverse" direction.  And the same is true for ATM networks in the 
U.S.; for the latter, see McAndrews (2003). 
     19 It is sometimes claimed that the interchange fee is required to be paid by the merchant to the issuing bank (and it is 
thus described in Emch and Thompson (2006)); but in reality the fee is set by the network for payment between 
categories of banks.  Since the acquiring banks are near-universally considered to be highly competitive, the interchange 
fee is generally passed through entirely to merchants, thus giving rise to the (false) impression that it is levied directly on 
the merchants. 
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 Despite these complications, the basic idea remains of the two-sided market, the positive 
externalities between cardholders and merchants, and the network owner's interest in finding the set 
of net fees to cardholders and to merchants that maximizes the overall value of the network. 
 We can now use this framework and discussion to address the issues raised by Emch and 
Thompson (2006).  First, their model is closest in spirit to that portrayed here in Figure 1.  There are 
no complications of joint ownership of the network or of market power by issuing banks or 
acquiring banks.  Second, consistent with the figure, their model is one of fixed proportions (which 
greatly simplifies the two-sided market analysis) and simple per-transaction fees along the lines 
indicated.  Though their model encompasses three fees (an issuer switch fee, a merchant switch fee, 
and an interchange fee), one of these fees is clearly redundant, as they acknowledge. 
 Third, Emch and Thompson's merger analysis is in the spirit of the Merger Guidelines but 
also encompasses the two-sided markets insights.  As a consequence of a merger between two 
payments networks of the kind portrayed in Figure 1, either or both net prices could be affected.  As 
their model indicates, if merchants will accept any card so long as the net fee of a card is less than 
the merchant's costs of handling cash while cardholders choose networks on the basis of price, then 
an anticompetitive merger leaves the merchants' fee unchanged and causes the fee charged to 
cardholders to increase.  In essence, if the merchants' behavior allows them to be already subjected 
(pre-merger) to limit pricing, then the post-merger exercise of market power must manifest itself in 
the other (cardholder) market.  At the other extreme, if merchants choose among networks 
depending on fees while cardholders accept any card with costs that are less than those of handling 
cash, then the anticompetitive merger leaves fees to cardholders unchanged and causes fees to 
merchants to increase.  Again, the pre-merger existence of limit pricing on (this time) the cardholder 
side of the market dictates that the post-merger exercise of market power is manifested on the other 
side.  Finally, under a third set of assumptions Emch and Thompson show that with Bertrand 
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behavior among commodity-like networks, only a merger to monopoly will allow the net exercise of 
market power. 
 There are at least three important network issues that Emch and Thompson do not address.  
First, their model is partial equilibrium in nature, since merchants' pricing of their goods and services 
are assumed to be unchanged throughout.  It would be interesting to see what changes might occur if 
this restraint were lifted.  Second, the issue of the interchange fee's being set collectively by the joint 
venture members of the Visa and MasterCard networks -- rather than, say, on a negotiated basis 
between individual acquiring and issuing banks -- is not addressed in the Emch and Thompson 
model, since they opt for the simple structure of Figure 1.  But it is the collective nature of the 
interchange fee-setting in the Visa and MasterCard networks that has attracted so much regulatory 
and antitrust attention around the world.20  Third, the keynote question of delineating the relevant 
market with respect to payment networks for the consideration of monopolization claims in an 
antitrust context or a regulatory context is not addressed in the Emch and Thompson framework.  
Their comparative statics with respect to the number of networks provides the type of information 
that would be useful for a Merger Guidelines analysis.  But how would an analyst, observing the 
existing payment networks, be able to conclude that any individual network (or some, or all) was 
exercising market power?  Emch and Thompson have no ready answer to this important question. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Payment networks, antitrust, and regulation are likely to continue to be intertwined, for the reasons 
discussed in this essay.  For the purposes of merger analysis, the complexity (including two-sided 
                                                          
     20 As is clear from the portrayal in Figure 1, for an integrated ("proprietary") network like Discover or American 
Express the setting of the "interchange fee" is simply a unilateral maximizing decision.  It is an interesting hypothetical 
question to ask whether the interchange fees of the Visa and MasterCard networks would have attracted as much public 
policy attention if the two networks were not joint ventures by their participant banks but instead were simply free-
standing separately owned networks. 
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markets) of payments networks need not interfere with the straightforward and sensible application 
of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and specifically the market delineation paradigm that is at the 
heart of the Guidelines.  Once we leave merger analysis and try to deal with issues of market 
delineation and the exercise of market power in an ongoing antitrust or regulatory context, however, 
there are few analytical aids to help.  A major task of antitrust and regulatory analysis, for payments 
networks and for monopolization analysis more generally, must be to develop a workable paradigm 
of market delineation for such investigations. 
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    $1 + fn   Payments           $1 - tn 
American Express 
Discover 
fn + tn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  : Flow of goods 
  : Flow of payments 
fn = net fee (positive or negative) paid by card holder to network owner 
tn = net fee (positive or negative) paid by merchant to network owner 
 
Figure 1: A Simple Payment Card Network without Banks 
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        $1 + fib    Payments     $1 – tib – tpn - tab 
 
 
    $1 - tib          $1 - tib - tpn Issuing bank 
fib + tib 
Visa 
MasterCard 
tpn 
Acquiring bank 
tab 
 
 
 
  : Flow of goods 
  : Flow of payments 
fib = net fee (positive or negative) paid by card holder to issuing bank 
tib = net fee (positive or negative) received by issuing bank from network 
tpn = net fee received by Visa (or Mastercard) from acquiring bank 
tab = net fee received by acquiring bank from merchant 
 
Figure 2: A More Complex Payment Card Network Involving Banks and a Coordinating Entity 
 
